The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 54 | Number 2

May 1987

Ordinary/Extraordinary Means and Euthanasia
John P. Mullooly

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Mullooly, John P. (1987) "Ordinary/Extraordinary Means and Euthanasia," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 54 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol54/iss2/8

Article 8

Ordinary / Extraordinary Means
and Euthanasia
John P. Mullooly, M.D.
This article by Linacre's editor, who is immediate past president of the
State Medical Society of Wisconsin is reprinted with the permission of the
Wisconsin Medical J oumal, March, 1987.
Mrs. G. was a beautiful, vivacious lady with a wonderful family. One
day, she developed a splitting headache. She had had headaches before,
but nothing like this. She called her husband who immedicately came
home and found her unconscious on the floor in the kitchen, next to the
phone. He called paramedics, and within minutes, his wife was rushed to
the emergency room of the community hospital. Hasty examination
showed that she was in deep coma with a dilated pupil on the right, rigid
extremities and a Babinski sign on the left.
Because of respiratory distress, she was intubated, given oxygen, and
taken to Radiology where a computerized tomographic (CT) scan of the
brain revealed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage in the right
hemisphere.
During the next 72 hours, the patient stabilized and she could be
extubated, although she remained in a coma. Tube feeding was begun and
intravenous infusions were discontinued. Physical therapy was instituted
and appropriate nursing care continued. After three weeks ,of continued
coma, it was obvious that nursing home placement was in order, and she
was transferred to the appropriate facility where she resides to this day.
Fortunately, the financial resources and insurance of the family are
more than adequate for the care ofthe patient. Her husband has visited her
every day and continues to hope for her recovery. Her children have
likewise been most supportive of their father and pray daily for their
mother to recover.
However, the grim prospect of no chance for recovery has begun to
dawn upon the husband, for it has been many months since this
catastrophe occurred. He asks himself, "What is my obligation to my
wife?" The doctors give him no encouragement in regard to his wife's
prognosis. He is grateful that insurance is lightening the financial burden,
but when the insurance runs out, what is he to do? What are the obligations
which must be fulfilled? In short, what does a good man do in this morally
perplexing situation?
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If this scenario seems familiar, it can be repeated many times over in
these United States. Generally speaking, a patient is under no obligation to
use extraordinary means to take care of his health, but he must use
ordinary means. A crucial distinction is important to make here: it is the
patient who determines what is extraordinary for him or her, and not his
physician. What may be ordinary for the physician may be extraordinary
for the patient. For example, a physician might think that renal dialysis in
this day and age is very ordinary treatment for a patient in renal failure .
For the patient it may represent quite an extraordinary route to follow.
The patient's perception must be followed , assuming that the patient's
judgment and mental facilities are intact.
In the application of the ordinary/ extraordinary approach to clinical
decision-making, it is vital for us to determine what is extraordinary.
The usual distinctions are: (1) excessive pain and / or disability; (2)
economic considerations, eg, cost of care which would impoverish a
family; and (3) benefits outweighed by the risks.
While the outlining of these ethical rules is clear enough, the application
of them is sometimes very difficult. This is so because sometimes the
clinical facts are not yet clear. Sometimes the patient is so confused and
upset that rational, coherent, logical thought is impossible. Nevertheless,
having a clear set of ethical criteria is essential for the physician if he is to
behave ethically.
By far, one of the best helps to the physician in doing his job is a
knowledge of the patient and the family. There is no substitute for this, as
he brings profound insight to the wishes of the patient and the family. The
relationships which he has forged over the years with the patient will serve
him well when he is faced with having to make difficult clinical decisions
on whether to institute or withhold extraordinary measures. How often
have we been faced with decisions that house staff have made for our
patients at a time of crisis, with which decisions we disagree? Many times,
the house staff, acting in good faith, did what they thought was correct.
But we know that, had we been there, we might have done things
differently, based upon our knowledge of the patient and his wishes.
I vividly recall a patient who entered the hospital emergency room
comatose and in a state of seizure. I had known him for years. His whole
life had been one of tremendous activity and accomplishment. The CT
scan showed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage and his prognosis was
zero. The family was informed and very supportive. At that time we
decided that no extraordinary means would be used, as it was obvious that
they would be of no avail and would simply prolong the process of dying.
Despite orders to the contrary, a resident inserted an endotracheal tube
when the patient exhibited respiratory distress. I was informed and
ordered it removed, after talking to the family again. The patient died
shortly thereafter. Knowing this patient and the family so well made the
decision easy. Had the resident been aware or made himself aware of the
entire situation, he probably would not have embarked upon the
extraordinary procedure.
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In regard to patients who are in the process of dying, when their demise
is only days or weeks away, it is obvious that extraordinary means are out
ofthe question. Our principal duty is to support the patient and the family.
Pain control is essential. With the continuous morphine infusion pumps
which even the patients can regulate, pain can be alleviated or certainly
ameliorated to a great degree. Even if the dosage of analgesia contributes
to the demise of the patient, a physician or nurse should not feel culpable,
as the intent was to relieve pain, and not to cause the death of the patient.
In regard to fluids and nutrition in the imminently dying patient,
problems can be found. When the intravenous fluid infiltrates, or the
patient runs out of veins, or the vein becomes infected, what is one to do?
Consultation with the family is in order. If it is not feasible to use
intravenous fluids, they should be discontinued. What about nasogastric
tubes, and / or gastronomy tubes? Again, if in consultation with this family
these modalities are not feasible, they should be discontinued; and the
patient should be taken care of with the usual nursing care until he or she
dies. Emotional care and support are the keystone for the imminently
dying patient.
What does one do for the patient who is not dying, but who is
permanently comatose and probably on intravenous fluids or tube feeding
and in a nursing home? This is a most difficult and perplexing question. As
long as the patient receives nutrition and water, he or she will live. If the
patient does not receive these, he or she will surely die. What is our
obligation in these circumstances? Food and water are ordinary
requirements for life. To deprive a person of these requirements is morally
wrong. However, suppose that, in virtue ofthe fact that food and water are
artificially given, ie, via feeding or gastronomy tubes or intravenous
feedings, we have created an extraordinary means to keep this patient
alive? Suppose the cost of these artificial modalities, with the attendant
nursing care, becomes a tremendous financial burden on the family-must
this obligation continue to be fulfilled?
In light of the previous distinction, I think not, as exce~sive financial
burden certainly puts this into the extraordinary means realm. As pointed
out before, extraordinary means are never obligatory to the patient,
physician, or relatives.
In a very finely nuanced ethical analysis of the above ethical question,
Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J., in the Medical-Moral Newsletter of February
1987, states that it is "inappropriate, however, to refer to 'feeding' without
distinguishing between natural and artificial nutrition and hydration.
"The difference between normal eating and drinking and the artificial
(intravenous, nasogastric, etc.) delivery of nutrition and hydration is
clearly evident in the difference between eating in a restaurant and being
nourished in intensive care. The question is: How morally significant is this
difference? Or more specifically: Are both natural and artificial nutrition
and hydration to be considered as always ordinary means of prolonging
life, and therefore obligatory (unless their burden to the patient, or even to
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others, would clearly outweigh their benefit)? NOTE: The last parentheses
are included because it would seem that all moral theologians would admit
that the burden-benefit calculus in a particular case could render the
means extraordinary; certainly in the case of artificial feeding and even in
the case of natural feeding when that would be extremely painful and/ or
even dangerous to the patient, as it could be in some cases.
" ... we would hold that, at least in the case of incurable pathology
accompanied by definitely established irreversible coma and the attendant
inability to take food and water normally, artificial provision of nutrition
and hydration could be withheld or withdrawn either because the burden
of continuing treatment would be disproportionate to the benefit, or
because their continuation would be judged not to be clinically significant
or therapeutic.
"It is important to note that in the situation of incurable pathology
accompanied by-irreversible coma, the purpose (intention) to cause death
by withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration is unacceptable since
that would be 'euthanasia by intention.' Nor is withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration the cause of death. The cause of death is the
irreversible disease, which has caused both the terminal coma and the
inability to eat and drink. Since death would occur in the same way and
from the same cause if artificial nutrition and hydration were unavailable
or had never been started, they might be seen as an intervention that is
artificially interrupting an independently occurring process. Thus, rather
than causing death, their withdrawal accurately could be viewed as letting
inchoative death occur.
"In any discussion of ordinary and extraordinary means of prolonging
life in terminal illness, it seems reasonable and necessary to introduce a
category of 'minimal means' which must always be used, because to
withhold them when they can be received is equivalent to a positive act of
destruction. By these we mean food and water taken normally as distinct
from the clinical modalities of IV needles, gastric tupes, hyperalimentation
formulae, etc. Much of the current confusion in the discussion of
withholding nutrition and hydration results from the failure to make this
distinction. "
Perhaps this is the stance of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs' Opinion of 1986, in which it is stated that artificial hydration and
nutrition may be discontinued in the permanently comatose patient along
with other medical intervention. In issuing this Opinion, it would have
avoided much confusion if the proper distinction alluded to above had
been published along with the Opinion.
While the above ethical distinctions of ordinary/ extraordinary means
are quite clear in regard to nutrition and hydration, Mark Siegler, MD and
Alan J. Weisbard JDl pointed out in 1984 that the "powerful rhetoric of
death with dignity has gained intellectual currency and practical
importance in recent years." They stated in their article that "the death
with dignity movement advanced to a new frontier: the termination or
withdrawal of fluids and nutritional support."
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Siegler felt that this was an unexpected development and ran contrary to
the traditions of medical care, and he called for further debate on the
subject. After describing current thinking on the subject, he alludes to a
New England Journal of Medicine article in which a group of
distinguished clinicians advocated the withholding of parenteral fluids and
nutritional support from severely and irreversibly demented patients and
perhaps, at times, from elderly patients with permanent mild impairment
of competence (a group to which they refer as "pleasantly senile").2
Siegler offers several arguments against this stream of opinions to
discontinue fluids. He feels that patients will be protected against
diagnostic errors, inadequate treatment, and unscrupulous care for
financial or other reasons.
Furthermore, he states that physicians would not be forced to make ad
hoc, value-laden decisions nor would they be forced to act in violation of
their conscience in regard to standards of care. "Physicians also would be
spared the direct causal responsibility for the death of the patient and the
inevitable psychological association of this practice with active
euthanasia."
He warns that the "primary commitment of physicians to patients might
be compromised and the image of physicians tarnished at precisely the
time when physicians must establish the primacy of quality of care and not
become overwhelmed by cost-containment efforts which run contrary to
good clinical medicine."
Siegler states that "society's larger interest would be preserved by
rejecting the movement toward discontinuation of fluids in the dying
patient because it sows the seeds of unacceptable consequences." We have
witnessed too much history to disregard how easily society may disvalue
the lives of the "unproductive." The "angel of mercy" can become the
fanatic, bringing the "comfort" of death to some who do not clearly want
it, then to others who "would really be better off dead," and finally, to
undesirable persons, "which might involve the tern¥nally ill, the
permanently unconscious, the severely senile, the retarded, the incurably
and chronically ill, and, perhaps, the aged." While the allusions are to Nazi
Germany, Siegler'S concerns are reinforced by the "coming together of the
emerging stream of medical and ethical opinion with the torrent of public
and governmental concern with the cost of medical care. Cost containment
strategies may impose significant financial penalties on those who provide
prolonged care for the impaired elderly. In the current environment it may
well prove convenient-all too easy-to move from an individual's "right
to die" to a climate enforcing a "duty to die."
As we move into the waning years of the 20th century and look over the
medical environment and the direction in which it is heading, in my
estimation, Siegler's apprehensions seem to be justified. As he concludes
his article, he avows that this issue of withdrawing fluids and hydration is
most complicated, "the tradition of medicine to do no harm is long, and a
slow, conservative approach is most advisable." He feels that "compassionate calls for withdrawing of fluids in a few selected cases bears the
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seeds of great potential abuse. Little is to be lost and much to be gained by
slowing down the process, by taking stock of where we have come from
and where we are going, by improving our methods of comforting and
caring for the dying without necessarily hUrrying to dispatch them on their
way, and by deferring any premature legal, ethical, or professional
approval and legitimization of this new course. Continuing to administer
fluids, even to dying patients, provides an important clinical, psychological, and social barrier that should be retained."
Does Siegler's approach seem viable in these times? With the continued
barrage from government, business, and industry on cost containment, the
medical profession is on the defensive. As Siegler points out, there is a
growing acceptance for this among physicians, ethicians, philosophers
and, of course, the Euthanasia Society of America. It behooves us all to
ponder the implications of Siegler's arguments, to hone our ethical skills,
to use the ethical guidelines of the AMA with great caution, and to remain
close to the patient and his or her family.
When all is said and done in ethical matters, this is where the action is. If
the physician treats his patient as he himself would like to be treated , if he
does no harm, then he has fulfilled his obligation to his patient with a clear
conscience. Continued discussion and debate are essential to further
clarify this most difficult and perplexing ethical question.
The reason that the food and water element is so important in the
comatose patient is because it isolates a problem upon which we can focus
to make some telling points. We know that the patient, although
comatose, will live if fed , even though it is artificially done . Assuming that
this is ordinary means, the patient will continue to live until some other
pathological process supervenes. If nutrition is withdrawn, the patient will
surely die in a short time. If a family or physician wishes to dispense with
these ordinary means, the intent of the family or physician must be
examined. Do they wish the patient to die and accomplish this by
removing the only things which keep him living, namely food and water?
Or do they simply want to let him die? If we asstIme that fluids and
nutrition, artificially given, are ordinary means, and these supports are
withdrawn, then we are talking about euthanasia by omission. On the
other hand, if they can be categorized as extraordinary, then no obligation
exists.
In a larger context, however, it would be well for us to ponder histor
and what it is warning us about when we consider the above. There have
been and are various movements in this century and in our own time which
are very disturbing to physicians who cherish their medical ethic, to do no
harm . When we contemplate what happened to people in the Third Reich
in the 1930s and 1940s, where mental defectives were eliminated as being
unfit to live, and have this escalated to include the Jews and political
dissidents; when we see where these euthanasia programs were begun by
elements in the German medical professions and brought to terrifying
proportions by that evil man, Hitler; when we see that life is being devalued
in our society by the sickening statistics which come in each year on
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elective abortions (20,000,000 since 1972), it must be obvious to even the
most insensitive that we, as physicians, should be on guard. We should not
be lulled into complacency by bland words or by double-talk. There is a
drive for euthanasia going on in this country-euthanasia not simply by
omission but by commission. If you doubt it, I would remind you that such
legislation has been introduced into the California Legislature. The
various courts have not been very supportive of us and some opinions have
a most chilling impact on us and our medical ethics; eg, the Compton
decision in the Bouvia case. Elizabeth Bouvia wished to die by starvation
and wished the physicians and hospital to help her accomplish this. The
hospital refused and the case came to court. Judge Compton in denying the
hospital position stated the following:
"Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that
she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her,
intolerable condition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that
decision. The state and the medical profession instead of frustrating her
desire, should be attempting t'o relieve her suffering by permitting and in
fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to
suffer the ordeal of self-starvation to achieve her objective is in itself
inhumane.
"The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should,
in my opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance from others,
including the medical profession in making death as painless and quick as
possible.
"That ability should not be hampered by the state's threat to impose
legal sanctions on those who might be disposed to lend assistance.
"The medical profession, freed of the threat of governmental or legal
reprisal, would, I am sure, have no difficulty in accommodating an
individual in Elizabeth's situation."
In short, Judge Compton wishes that the medical profession would
forsake its medical ethic and kill the patient if she so desires. What a
perversion of legal thought and abasement of judicial prudence!
I
In summing up, the good physician must be the patient advocate to the
end, even until death, do no harm and be aware of those who are trying to
manipulate and corrupt his medical ethic. We are living in hard times for
the medical profession, but when all is said and done, all we have left is our
dedication and unswerving adherence to our Hippocratic Oath. How
much money we made, how well our family has done, how many papers we
have written, how many deliveries we have made, how many surgeries we
have performed, will be as nothing if we have compromised on our solemn
oath to do no harm. For it is on this oath and our adherence to it that we
find our identity, our reason for being, and our worth as a physician.
It is upon our adherence to our oath that we will be judged. Let us hope
that we of this generation will not be found wanting!
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